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I. INTRODUCTION
Consent is the Philosophers' Stone1 of the law: it can transmute an
unconstitutional search into a lawful one, a criminal act into a legal
one, or a tort into a contract. As technology has evolved, so has this
fundamental legal concept. New forms of communication call for new
ways to obtain and manifest consent. Examples include shrink-wrap
licenses, 2 click-to-accept licenses,3 faxed signatures, 4 e-mails,5 and e-
signatures. 6 Each of these forms, however, requires some affirmative
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW.
* Associate Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law; Faculty, The Johns
Hopkins University. I would like to thank my research assistants, Lisa Paganini
and Lisa Morgan, for their tireless efforts in search of the obscure.
1. "A reputed solid substance or preparation supposed by the alchemists to possess
the property of changing other metals into gold or silver, the discovery of which
was the supreme object of alchemy." 11 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 686
(R.W. Burchfield ed., 2d ed. 1989).
2. See, e.g., Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
3. See, e.g., Home Basket Co. v. Pampered Chef, Ltd., No. 04-1314-WEB, 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 513, at *1 (D. Kan. Jan. 12, 2005).
4. See, e.g., Patterson Frozen Foods, Inc. v. Crown Foods Int'l, Inc., 307 F.3d 666
(7th Cir. 2002).
5. See, e.g., Lamle v. Mattel, Inc., 394 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
6. See, e.g., 37 C.F.R. § 2.33(d) (2005); TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCE-
DURE §§ 304.08, 804.05 (3d ed. 2003).
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action by the person sought to be bound. An emerging issue is
whether permissions granted by a computer program can constitute
consent on behalf of the computer's owner, particularly where the per-
missions are set by default in the distributed form of the program
rather than by a conscious decision by the owner to set them.
On November 8, 2005, the Boston Globe reported that Computer
Associates International had concluded that Sony BMG was distribut-
ing music compact discs which contained not only the music that pur-
chasers wanted, but also code which would run on the purchaser's
computer, collect information about the purchaser, and report that in-
formation back to Sony.7 On November 18, 2005 (following Microsoft's
decision to classify the Sony program as spyware and provide tools to
remove it),8 Sony recalled the CDs and offered to replace those that
had already been sold.9
On December 29, 2005, the New York Times reported that the Na-
tional Security Agency had used cookies in transactions on its web-
site10 in violation of agency guidelines which had been in place since
at least as early as 1999.11 On January 6, 2006, CNET reported that
7. Hiawatha Bray, Security Firm: Sony CDs Secretly Install Spyware, BOSTON
GLOBE, Nov. 8, 2005, at D1.
8. Id.
9. See Sony BMG Music Entertainment, Important Legal Notice/Software Update
Notice, http://cp.sonybmg.com/xcp (last visited Jan. 30, 2006). On December 4,
2005, Sony issued an apology. Sony BMG Music Entertainment, To Our Valued
Customers (Dec. 4, 2005), http://cp.sonybmg.com/xcp/customerletter.html.
10. Associated Press, Spy Agency Removes Illegal Tracking Files, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
29, 2005, at A16.
11. Office of Management and Budget, Guidance and Model Language for Federal
Web Site Privacy Policies (June 1, 1999), http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/memo-
randa/m99-18attach.html.
Later, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) placed restrictions on at
least "persistent" cookies. Agencies were prohibited from using such cookies un-
less approved by the agency head upon a showing of a "compelling need to gather
data" and "clear and conspicuous notice." Letter from John T. Spotilla, Adm'r,
Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, to Roger Baker, Chief Info. Officer (Sept. 5,
2000), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/cookies-letter905OO.
html. The policy provides the following:
1. Tracking technology prohibitions:
a. agencies are prohibited from using persistent cookies or any other
means (e.g., web beacons) to track visitors' activity on the Internet
except as provided in subsection (b) below;
b. agency heads may approve, or may authorize the heads of sub-
agencies or senior official(s) reporting directly to the agency head
to approve, the use of persistent tracking technology for a compel-
ling need. When used, agency's [sic] must post clear notice in the
agency's privacy policy of:
" the nature of the information collected;
" the purpose and use for the information;
* whether and to whom the information will be disclosed; and
* the privacy safeguards applied to the information collected.
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"[slixty-six politicians in the U.S. Senate and House of Representa-
tives are setting permanent Web cookies even though at least 23 of
them have promised not to use the online tracking technique."12
These are clear examples, and probably isolated instances, of viola-
tions of computer users' rights. There are, however, widespread uses
of similar technology that pose significantly more far-reaching issues.
Cookies are files stored on a user's computer (the client) on instruc-
tion from a second computer (the server) when the client's web
browser software (browser) communicates with the server's website.
These files typically contain encrypted information relating to the
transaction between the client and server. By default, current brows-
ers "accept cookies," that is, they allow the server to write these files
to the client and to store them for a period of time determined by the
server. Since the data in the file is under the control of the server, it
can be used to record and monitor the transactions between the client
and server. If the server has appropriate decrypting capability, it can
also monitor transactions between the client and other servers. The
use of cookies without consent of the user raises a number of issues:
* First, does the use of cookies constitute a trespass on the client
computer?
* Second, when the server is controlled by a private party, does its
use of cookies constitute unauthorized access to a computer in vio-
lation of criminal law?
* Third, when the server is controlled by a government agency, does
its use of cookies constitute (in addition to the above violation of
c. agencies must report the use of persistent tracking technologies as
authorized for use by subsection b. above (see section VII).
2. The following technologies are not prohibited:
a. Technology that is used to facilitate a visitor's activity within a
single session (e.g., a "session cookie") and does not persist over
time is not subject to the prohibition on the use of tracking
technology.
b. Customization technology (to customize a website at the visitor's
request) if approved by the agency head or designee for use (see
v.L.b above) and where the following is posted in the Agency's Pri-
vacy Policy:
" the purpose of the tracking (i.e., customization of the site);
* that accepting the customizing feature is voluntary;
" that declining the feature still permits the individual to use the
site; and
" the privacy safeguards in place for handling the information
collected.
c. Agency use of password access to information that does not involve
.persistent cookies" or similar technology.
Memorandum from the Office of Mgmt. & Budget, to the Heads of Executive
Dep'ts & Agencies (Sept. 26, 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/
memorandam03-22.html.
12. Declan McCullagh & Anne Broache, Congress' Hands Caught in the Cookie Jar,
CNET NEWS.COM, Jan. 6, 2006, available at http://news.com.com/Congress+
hands+caught+in+the+cookie+jar2100-1028_3-6020711.html.
2006]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
rights) an unlawful search in violation of the Fourth Amendment
or an unlawful seizure of property in violation of the Fifth
Amendment?
* And fourth, if the use of cookies without permission violates crimi-
nal law, individual constitutional rights, or other rights, is there
potential secondary liability for the providers of the browser
software under the principles announced by the Supreme Court in
MGM v. Grokster?13
Technically, a browser will not accept a cookie from a website un-
less its permissions have been set to do so. Does this technical an-
swer-cookies are used only when permission has been given in a
technical sense-equate to "consent" in the legal sense sufficient to
authorize the transaction and insulate the setter of the cookie from
the above types of liability?
If the answer is "no," then websites which set cookies are at risk for
civil and criminal liability, government websites which set cookies fur-
ther risk violating constitutional rights, and the distributors of web
browsers face potential secondary liability for the use of their
products.
II. TECHNOLOGICAL BACKGROUND
A cookie 14 is a text file embedded in an HTTP file exchanged be-
tween a server and a web browser running on a client, and it is re-
trievable by the server.15 When a user browses a webpage, the
website sends an image of the webpage as an HTML file using HTTP.
If the user's computer is set to allow cookies, the webpage may embed
a cookie in the HTML file, and the cookie is then stored on the user's
computer. When the user next contacts the website, the user's com-
puter sends a request for an HTML file and the cookie is embedded in
the request. In this fashion, a website can track information relating
to prior transactions with the user's computer. This process is re-
ferred to as "setting" a cookie. The server site sets the cookie, which
typically contains client information, on the client computer, from
13. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005).
14. Although they will be referred to herein as "cookies," typical Internet cookies are
more precisely "HTTP Cookies," so called because they are text embedded in
HTTP files, the principal engine of Internet webpage exchanges.
15. Wikipedia, HTP cookie, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP_Cookie (last visited
Oct. 6, 2006); see also, e.g., 32 C.F.R. § 806b app. (2005) (defining a cookie as
"[diata created by a Web server that is stored on a user's computer either tempo-
rarily for that session only or permanently on the hard disk (persistent cookie). It
provides a way for the Web site to identify users and keep track of their prefer-
ences. It is commonly used to 'maintain the state' of the session. A third-party
cookie either originates on or is sent to a Web site different from the one you are
currently viewing.").
[Vol. 85:383
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which the server can retrieve it during a web browsing session.16
Cookies are useful in streamlining transactions by reducing the need
for repeated transfer of redundant information in exchanges between
clients and servers over the Internet. Cookies can store data so that a
server can be provided with information about the client's settings,
past browsing history, authentication, or preferences without the
user's needing to reenter the data; cookies can encode information so
that only a small coded file needs to be transferred in order to convey
larger amounts of information.17 A common use of cookies is to main-
tain a shopping basket on a commercial website-the user can provide
authenticating information and a credit card number once during a
session, sequentially select items for purchase, and then execute a sin-
gle purchase instruction.1 8 The resulting efficiency is especially im-
16. The cookie is embedded in the HTML files which are exchanged between the cli-
ent and server during a browsing session. The server embeds the cookie in the
HTML file sent to the client, and when the client communicates with the server
(for example, to request a webpage), it embeds the cookie in the communication.
17. For example, if a client prefers the server to display in yellow twelve-point Times
New Roman font on a blue background, this can be encoded as preference "A" and
stored in a cookie on the client computer. When the client logs on to the server,
the server only needs to retrieve "A," then look up its meaning in the server's own
database, rather than transfer "yellow twelve-point Times New Roman font on a
blue background." Because internal lookups are significantly faster than
equivalent Internet data transfers, this reduces total transaction time. Further-
more, if either party is paying for bandwidth based on the number of bits trans-
ferred, this will reduce the cost as well.
18. In In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litigation, 329 F.3d 9, 14 (1st Cir. 2003), the
court stated: "[C]ookies often store user preferences, login and registration infor-
mation, or information related to an online 'shopping cart.' Cookies may also con-
tain unique identifiers that allow a website to differentiate among users."
However, it is also possible to collect personal information: "The following per-
sonal information was found on Pharmatrak servers: names, addresses, tele-
phone numbers, email addresses, dates of birth, genders, insurance statuses,
education levels, occupations, medical conditions, medications, and reasons for
visiting the particular website." Id. at 15. For another example, see U.S. Patent
No. 5,960,411 (filed Sept. 12, 1999), where the patent's abstract describes the
invention as follows:
A method and system for placing an order to purchase an item via the
Internet. The order is placed by a purchaser at a client system and re-
ceived by a server system. The server system receives purchaser infor-
mation including identification of the purchaser, payment information,
and shipment information from the client system. The server system
then assigns a client identifier to the client system and associates the
assigned client identifier with the received purchaser information. The
server system sends to the client system the assigned client identifier
and an HTML document identifying the item and including an order
button. The client system receives and stores the assigned client identi-
fier and receives and displays the HTML document. In response to the
selection of the order button, the client system sends to the server sys-
tem a request to purchase the identified item. The server system re-
ceives the request and combines the purchaser information associated
with the client identifier of the client system to generate an order to
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portant when bandwidth is a limiting factor, as for example when
retrieving large files over modem connections. The cookie may be
stored in the client's random access memory (RAM) (in which case it
disappears when the client computer is turned off, the user's browser
is closed, or, at the server's option, when the transaction with the
browser ends), or it may (again, at the server's option) be stored on the
client's hard drive (in which case the duration of the cookie is deter-
mined by the server). 19 A cookie which is stored in RAM or erased
from the client's hard drive at the end of the transaction is referred to
as a "temporary" or "session" cookie; a cookie which remains on the
hard drive after the session is closed is referred to as a "persistent"
cookie.20
In addition to cookies set and retrieved by the server from which
the client has requested a webpage, third-party cookies may be set
and retrieved. For example, a server may provide information to an
advertising website 2 1 advising of the client's interests (as evidenced
by the webpages the client has requested) so as to enable the advertis-
ing website to select targeted advertising to be presented to the
client.2 2
Theoretically, the ability of a server to set a cookie is controlled by
the user. All common browsers have settings which allow the user to
block (at the user's option) some or all cookies. However, the default
setting is to allow cookies; browsers do not conspicuously advise users
that cookies are being accepted, and the process for changing the de-
fault settings requires sufficient sophistication to navigate through
purchase the item in accordance with the billing and shipment informa-
tion whereby the purchaser effects the ordering of the product by selec-
tion of the order button.
19. Of course, the same information could be stored on the server, which has implica-
tions for analysis of trespass and unauthorized access. See infra section IV.A. For
such a system to work, the client user would need to log in so that the appropriate
data could be matched to the client. There are at least three reasons website
operators might prefer to store the information on the client computer: obviously,
it uses client resources rather than server resources; the information can be
shared with other servers; and, at least with current technology, there is no need
to request user cooperation.
20. These definitions can be found in Microsoft's Internet Explorer under "Help"/
"Contents and Index"/"cookies"/"types of cookies."
21. E.g., In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litig., 220 F. Supp. 2d 4 (D. Mass. 2002).
22. Third-party advertising may be incorporated in the page requested by the client
as a banner, or may be sent as a pop-up or pop-under ad. Third-party cookies
present special issues with respect to client consent in connection with trespass
and criminal liability. See infra section IV.A. They also present special issues of
aggregation, similar to those presented by government cookies. See infra section
IV.C.
[Vol. 85:383388
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several layers of commands. 23 The most ubiquitous browser running
under the Windows operating system, Microsoft's Internet Explorer,
defaults to allow all cookies and provides user control under the
"Tools"/"Internet Options"/"Privacy" menu, where the user can select
levels of privacy which restrict the ability of selected servers to set
cookies-hardly a straightforward process for many users. The
Mozilla-based browsers 24 provide greater user control 2 5 but still re-
quire navigation, 2 6 and are set to allow all cookies by default.2 7
The server's website may be designed to refuse access to a client if
the client's browser is set so that cookies are not allowed. Assuming
that the owner of the server is under no obligation to provide access, 28
using this power does not run afoul of the law. If the user's browser is
set to reject cookies and the server's website is set to refuse access
where cookies are disabled, the user will need to make a conscious
decision whether access to the site is worth the price of allowing cook-
23. The index to the Windows XP basic guide does not even list "cookies," although it
does list "HTML" and "HTTP." The "Help" file for the current version of Internet
Explorer provides the following information under "Cookies"I"About Cookies":
Understanding cookies
Some Web sites store information in a small text file on your com-
puter. This file is called a cookie.
There are several types of cookies, and you can choose whether to
allow some, none, or all of them to be saved on your computer. If you do
not allow cookies at all, you may not be able to view some Web sites or
take advantage of customization features (such as local news and
weather, or stock quotes).
Conspicuously absent in the top-level summary is any suggestion that the
small text file" may contain a user's personal information, or why a user might
want to "choose ... to allow some, none, or all of them." Those details are pro-
vided under the "How cookies are used" subindex of "Cookies"I"About Cookies."
Some third-party websites provide instructions for controlling cookies on major
browsers. See, e.g., Junkbusters, How Web Servers' Cookies Threaten Your Pri-
vacy, http://www.junkbusters.com/cookies.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2006) (provid-
ing instructions on "[h]ow to disable cookies").
24. Mozilla-based browsers include Mozilla Firefox and Netscape 6, as well as earlier
browsers.
25. For example, cookies can be forced to expire when the browser is closed.
26. The commands are located in the "Tools"/"Options"I"Privacy"/"Cookies" subfolder
of the Mozilla Firefox browser.
27. See, for example, the Mozilla Firefox browser's "Help" menu under "Managing
Cookies"I"Setting Up Cookie Rules."
28. There are circumstances in which the server owner may be under such an obliga-
tion. Two examples are paid subscription services and services supported by
grants conditioned on public access. Unless the relevant contract allows the
owner of the server to condition access on the client's acceptance of cookies, denial
of access would be a breach of contract (and, of course, the contract could not be
used to demonstrate authorization so as to avoid criminal liability). Government
websites present a special case with additional issues. See infra section IV.C. At
least with respect to criminal statutes, the dual requirements of intent and lack
of consent may be sufficient to protect the server owner who reasonably, but mis-
takenly, relies on the competence of the user.
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ies. If a legally competent user makes the decision to accept cookies,
there is neither violation of the law nor cause for complaint. 29
III. THE NATURE OF CONSENT
The definition of consent is contextual. In a general sense, consent
is defined as "[aigreement, approval, or permission as to some act or
purpose."30 Express consent is "[clonsent that is clearly and unmis-
takably stated,"3 ' while implied consent is "[clonsent inferred from
one's conduct rather than from one's direct expression."3 2 The exis-
tence of consent in a particular case is a question of fact and may be
inferred from actions. Mass marketers have faced the problem of ob-
taining consent in wholesale contexts and have developed techniques
for obtaining consent without retail negotiations of consent.3 3
In the tort context,
[clonsent means that the person concerned is in fact willing for the conduct of
another to occur. Normally this willingness is manifested directly to the other
by words or acts that are intended to indicate that it exists. It need not, how-
ever, be manifested by words or by affirmative action. It may equally be man-
ifested by silence or inaction, if the circumstances or other evidence indicates
that the silence or inaction is intended to give consent. Even without a mani-
festation, consent may be proved by any competent evidence to exist in fact,
and when so proved, it is as effective as if manifested.
3 4
The consequence of consent is that "[o]ne who effectively consents to
conduct of another intended to invade his interests cannot recover in
an action of tort for the conduct or for harm resulting from it."35
In the criminal context, a victim cannot consent to a crime since
the victim cannot waive the right of the state to prosecute. However, a
victim's consent may convert what would otherwise be a criminal act
into a legal act. For example, it is ordinarily criminal to attack a per-
son with a knife; even if two people agreed to settle a disagreement
with a knife fight, that agreement would not prevent prosecution of
both parties for criminal assault and battery. However, a patient may
agree to surgery, converting what would otherwise be a criminal act
into a lawful one.
In the context of constitutional protection against unreasonable
search and seizure, consent means permission granted provided "a
29. The special case of acceptance by users who are not legally competent presents
other issues relating to both primary liability, see infra notes 192-94 and accom-
panying text, and secondary liability, see infra section IV.D.
30. BLACiKs LAW DICTIONARY 323 (8th ed. 2004).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. For example, mass marketers of software have developed solutions for shrink
wrap licenses and "click-to-accept" agreements. See supra notes 2-3 and accom-
panying text.
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892 cmt. b (1979).
35. Id. § 892A.
[Vol. 85:383
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reasonable person would feel free to decline the ... requests or other-
wise terminate the encounter."3 6
Consent has numerous potential effects with respect to cookies.
Consent can insulate against civil liability for trespass, invasion of
privacy, or battery;3 7 it can insulate against criminal liability for tres-
pass, wiretapping, or unauthorized access to computers; and it can le-
gitimize a governmental search and seizure. There is, however, a
possible perceptual disconnect between the parties to a cookie transac-
tion. The party setting the cookie knows that the cookie may not be
set unless the recipient's computer gives permission to do so, but the
recipient may not know how the computer is configured. Although
consent may be implied from actions, there must be a reasonable be-
lief that the action is meant to convey consent.38 Under the current
state of user sophistication, it does not appear that the action of ac-
cepting cookies carries the necessary implication of consent in the ab-
sence of specific, conspicuous notice.
IV. ABSENCE OF CONSENT: THE RISKS
A. Trespass to Chattel
Placing information on a third party's computer without authoriza-
tion may constitute a trespass to chattel. 39 A trespass to chattel is
"intentionally (a) dispossessing another of the chattel, or (b) using or
intermeddling with a chattel in the possession of another."40 Even ac-
cidental harm suffices to impose liability,4 1 and the degree of interfer-
36. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436 (1991).
37. Of particular interest in this context is the following:
Exceeding privilege. If the actor exceeds the consent given, the consent
does not protect him from liability for the excess. When, as is normally
the case, the harm caused by the excess is severable from that resulting
from the privileged act, the actor is subject to liability only for the excess.
Thus if there is consent to an entry on land for a proper purpose and the
actor enters for that purpose and subsequently commits an unpermitted
tort upon the premises, he becomes liable for the subsequent tort but not
for the original entry.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892A cmt. h (1979).
38. Id. § 892 cmt. b.
39. The cases to date fall into two main categories: those where the unwanted infor-
mation was transmitted (for example, unsolicited e-mail), see infra notes 45, 57
and accompanying text, and those where the information was appropriated (for
example, by web crawlers), see infra note 52 and accompanying text.
40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 217 (1965). Comment e defines "intermed-
dling" as "intentionally bringing about a physical contact with the chattel."
41. While intent is an element of the offense,
an intention is present when an act is done for the purpose of using or
otherwise intermeddling with a chattel or with knowledge that such an
intermeddling will, to a substantial certainty, result from the act. It is
not necessary that the actor should know or have reason to know that
such intermeddling is a violation of the possessory rights of another.
20061
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ence need not be great.4 2 While consent is a defense, exceeding the
scope of authorization vitiates that consent.4 3 The development of
trespass theory has followed scientific developments in interpreting
what can constitute a physical invasion, and it now encompasses elec-
tronic invasion.44
In Compuserve Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc.,45 one of the earliest
electronic trespass cases, Compuserve sold Internet and e-mail access
to subscribers, and Cyber Promotions sent mass, unsolicited e-mail
advertising46 to Compuserve's subscribers. Compuserve produced evi-
dence of subscribers' complaining and threatening to cancel their sub-
scriptions. 4 7 In response to the complaints, Compuserve established
screens to block e-mails from Cyber Promotions' address, but Cyber
Promotions circumvented the screens by falsifying the "sender" infor-
mation in its e-mails.48 The district court enjoined all Cyber Promo-
tions' e-mails to Compuserve customers as a trespass, finding that the
transmission of electronic signals to Compuserve's customers (and,
thus, Compuserve's computers) satisfied the physical contact require-
ment 49 and that the resulting demand for disk space and processing
power reduced the availability of resources for Compuserve's subscrib-
ers and diminished the value of Compuserve's equipment.5 0 The court
rejected the argument that, by making its service available to the gen-
eral public, Compuserve consented to any and all e-mailers, although
the court required that there be notice that such mass mailings were
not permitted.51 Because technological advances have outpaced judi-
Thus, it is immaterial that the actor intermeddles with the chattel under
a mistake of law or fact which has led him to believe that he is the pos-
sessor of it or that the possessor has consented to his dealing with it.
Id. cmt. c.
42. See, e.g., eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1065 (N.D. Cal.
2000) (granting a preliminary injunction and finding a trespass where evidence
(on summary motions) showed that the unwanted access to eBay's computers rep-
resented between 1.11% and 1.53% of the total load on its listing servers, though
the evidence failed to show that expenses were incrementally incurred because of
the trespass, or that any particular service disruption could be attributed to the
activities).
43. Id. at 1070.
44. Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468 (Ct. App. 1996).
45. 962 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
46. This is now called "spain."
47. Compuserve, 962 F. Supp. at 1019.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1021.
50. Id. at 1028.
51. Id. at 1024; accord Am. Online, Inc. v. IMS, 24 F. Supp. 2d 548 (E.D. Va. 1998);
Am. Online, Inc. v. LCGM, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 444 (E.D. Va. 1998) (granting
injunctions against unsolicited mass e-mail, upon showing of electronic transmis-
sion to plaintiffs computer, resulting in impairment of condition, quality or
value).
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cial resolution of the issue of the degree of interference required in
order to constitute trespass, the question remains unresolved.
In eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc.,52 Bidder's Edge used an auto-
mated process to repeatedly access eBay's auction website to collect
data on the status of its auctions. 53 Although the eBay website was
open to, and invited, the public, Bidder's Edge accessed the site
100,000 times per day.54 The court held that this level of access ex-
ceeded the authorization granted to the public to access the website
and therefore found the lack of consent necessary to constitute a tres-
pass. 55 The court found the necessary element of interference with
property in Bidder's Edge's use of eBay's computer system capacity,
depriving eBay "of the ability to use that portion of its personal prop-
erty for its own purposes."56
The mere transmission of electronic signals was held insufficient to
establish trespass, however, in Intel Corp. v. Hamidi.5 7 There,
Hamidi, a former Intel employee, used Intel's computer system by
sending several mass e-mailings critical of management to between
8,000 and 35,000 Intel employees5 8 contrary to Intel's guidelines for
computer use. Intel testified that some employees found the messages
unwelcome, and that its technical staff spent time and effort attempt-
ing to block them; the former employee admitted using multiple com-
puters in an effort to circumvent the employer's efforts to block the e-
mails. 59 The California Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals'
decision to uphold an injunction against continued trespass to chattel,
finding that the undisputed facts demonstrated no damage or threat
of damage to the computer system, and holding that trespass did not
cover electronic communication that "neither damages the recipient
computer system nor impairs its functioning."60 The court distin-
guished spamming cases, where it perceived that large quantities of e-
mail might overburden a computer system, and interpreted the hold-
ing in eBay as consistent with its view, since the eBay court, though
commenting that "[elven if... its searches use only a small amount of
eBay's computer system capacity, [Bidder's Edge] has nonetheless de-
prived eBay of the ability to use that portion of its personal property
52. 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
53. "Trograms that recursively query other computers over the Internet in order to
obtain a significant amount of information are referred to . . . by various names,
including software robots, robots, spiders and web crawlers." Id. at 1060 n.2.
54. Id. at 1063.
55. Id. at 1070.
56. Id. at 1071.
57. 71 P.3d 296, 309-10 (Cal. 2003).
58. Id. at 323 (Kennard, J., concurring).
59. Id. at 301 (majority opinion).
60. Id. at 300.
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for its own purposes,"61 nevertheless went on to find "that the defen-
dant's conduct, if widely replicated, would likely impair the function-
ing of the plaintiffs system."6 2 In this way, eBay had shown potential
injury.6 3
That was not the case in Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc.,64
however. Ticketmaster and Tickets.com each sold tickets to events
and maintained websites to provide information as to location, date,
time, description of the event, and ticket prices. Tickets.com at-
tempted to list all events for which tickets were available. It obtained
information about competitors' tickets by using a program called a
"spider" or "crawler" to review their websites and extract the informa-
tion. When Tickets.corn did not have tickets available for sale, it
linked to a website that did. One of the linked sites was Tick-
etmaster's. Ticketmaster filed suit alleging breach of contract, copy-
right infringement, and trespass. Disagreeing with other district
court holdings that no harm need be shown in order to establish an
electronic trespass, Senior Judge Hupp found that the use of Tick-
etmaster's resources was "very small" and that there was "no showing
that the use interfere[d] to any extent with [Ticketmaster's] regular
business."65 Observing that "scholars and practitioners alike have
criticized the extension of the trespass to chattels doctrine to the in-
ternet context, noting that this doctrinal expansion threatens basic in-
ternet functions (i.e., search engines) and exposes the flaws inherent
in applying doctrines based in real and tangible property to cyber-
space,"6 6 the court held that the mere use of a spider to enter a pub-
licly available website to gather information, without more, was
insufficient to fulfill the harm requirement for trespass to chattel6 7
and dismissed Tickmaster's trespass claims.
In Oyster Software, Inc. v. Forms Processing, Inc.,68 the plaintiff
sued a competitor that had accessed its computer system, asserting a
61. Id. at 306 (quoting eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1071).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. No. CV-99-7654-HLHVBKX, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6483 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 6,
2003).
65. Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. CV-99-7654, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
12987, at *17 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2000).
66. Ticketmaster, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6483, at *11 (citing Laura Quilter,
Cyberlaw: Regulating Conduct on the Internet: The Continuing Expansion of
Cyberspace Trespass to Chattels, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 421 (2002); R. Clifton
Merrell, Trespass to Chattels in the Age of the Internet, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 675
(2002); Mary Anne Bendotoff & Elizabeth R. Gosse, "Stay OffMy Cyberproperty!":
Trespass to Chattels on the Internet, INTELL. PROP. L. BULL., Spring 2001, at 12;
Edward Lee, Rules and Standards for Cyberspace, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1275,
1283-84 (2002)).
67. Id. at *13.
68. No. C-00-0724JCS, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22520 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2001).
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variety of federal and state causes of action, including trespass. The
court denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment in which
the defendant asserted that its access did not constitute trespass, even
though the plaintiff had conceded that the access had "placed a 'negli-
gible' load on [the plaintiffs] computer system.6 9 The court noted the
conflicting approaches of the eBay and Ticketmaster courts:
While the eBay decision could be read to require an interference that was
more than negligible (as did the court in Ticketmaster), this Court concludes
that eBay, in fact, imposes no such requirement. Ultimately, the court in that
case concluded that the defendant's conduct was sufficient to establish a cause
of action for trespass not because the interference was "substantial" but sim-
ply because the defendant's conduct amounted to "use" of Plaintiffs com-
puter .... [That court relied on language saying that] a plaintiff can sustain
an action for trespass to chattels, as opposed to an action for conversion, with-
out showing a substantial interference with its right to possession of that
chattel. Therefore, the Court declines to dismiss Oyster's trespass claim on
the grounds that Oyster has shc wn only a minimal interference because Oys-
ter has presented evidence of 'use" ....70
In Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc.,71 Register.com sought to enjoin
Verio from using an automated process to monitor Register.com's In-
ternet domain name registry in order to compile a customer list, al-
though Register.com had no published policy prohibiting such activity
and could not provide proof of quantifiable damage from the activity.
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to grant the
injunction as within that court's discretion, relying on the finding that
Verio's use of search robots "consumed a significant portion of the ca-
pacity of Register's computer systems" and that "[w]hile Verio's robots
alone would not incapacitate Register's systems, the [lower] court
found that if Verio were permitted to continue," a more significant
trespass was "highly probable."72
Thus, courts73 appear to reach conclusions which can be reconciled
only by attempting to quantify "impact" on computer resources, an in-
herently ambiguous concept. An impact which might be imperceptible
at one instant could be catastrophic at another. An impact which
69. Id. at *39-40.
70. Id. at *40-41 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
71. 126 F. Supp. 2d 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
72. Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 404 (2d Cir. 2004).
73. In the interest of completeness, it should also be noted that state trespass claims
may be appended to federal claims under statutes such as the Electronic Commu-
nications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-190, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified as
enacted and amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). Courts are reluctant to
retain jurisdiction over such state claims if the federal claim is dismissed. For
example, in In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litigation, 220 F. Supp. 2d 4 (D.
Mass. 2002), a state trespass claim was included in an ECPA case. Although
reversed on appeal in In re Pharmatrack, Inc. Privacy Litigation, 329 F.3d 9 (1st
Cir. 2003) (reversing the holding as to violation of the ECPA), the trial court dis-
missed the federal claims and declined to retain jurisdiction of the state trespass
claims. See also cases cited infra notes 185-86 and accompanying text.
2006]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
might be imperceptible to a machine with a state-of-the-art processor
and a large hard drive connected to a T1 connection might be cata-
strophic to a machine with a slower processor, a smaller hard drive,
and a dial-up connection. The problem for companies communicating
through the Internet is that they are not likely to know in advance
which configuration is on the receiving end of the communication.
B. Criminal Liability for Unauthorized Access
The typical American website does not provide conspicuous notice
that it sets cookies. Generally, notice is only provided if cookies have
been turned off and the site needs them in order to function, i.e., in
situations in which the user already has actual knowledge of cookies
and has made the decision not to allow them. In contrast, the Euro-
pean Union requires websites to advise users if the sites use cookies
and permit users to reject them. 7 4
Federal criminal statutes in the United States also prohibit certain
types of activities with respect to computers. The Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act 75 prohibits "exceeding authorized access"76 to a com-
puter, which means "to access a computer with authorization and to
use such access to obtain or alter information in the computer that the
accessor is not entitled so to obtain or alter."77 The Electronic Com-
munications Privacy Act78 prohibits intentional interception of wire,
oral, or electronic communications. 79 It also prohibits intentional un-
authorized access to a facility through which an electronic information
service is provided, or "intentionally exceed[ing] an authorization to
access that facility" and obtaining access to an electronic communica-
tion "while it is in electronic storage."8 0 The CFAA and the ECPA
both create private causes of action.8 1
74. Council Directive 2002/58/EC, Recital 25 & art. 5(3), Concerning the Processing
of Personal Data and the Protection of Privacy in the Electronic Communications
Sector (Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications), 2002 O.J. (L 201)
37, 39, 44 (EC).
75. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2000). Jurisdictionally, the plaintiff must show at least $5,000
in damages. Id. § 1030(e)(8).
76. Id. § 1030(a)(1). Similarly, § 1030(a), subsections (2) and (4), prohibit activity
that "exceeds authorized access."
77. Id. § 1030(e)(6).
78. Pub. L. No. 99-190, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986) (codified as enacted and amended in
scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.)
79. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
80. Id. § 2701(a). Although apparently redundant, subsection (c) provides an excep-
tion for conduct authorized by the person to whom the communication was
directed.
81. See id. §§ 2520, 2707.
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Most states also have statutes which prohibit unauthorized access
to computers.8 2 The term "unauthorized access" presents an issue of
interpretation. Access without authorization is clearly covered. It is
less clear whether the term covers the situation where there is author-
ity for initial access for certain purposes but not for subsequent use of
that access beyond the originally intended purposes, or where there is
arguably implied consent to access but no specific grant of access.
Both issues are directly relevant to the analysis of the use of cookies.
Arizona,8 3 Georgia,8 4 Hawaii,8 5 Maryland,8 6 Michigan,8 7 New
Mexico,8 8 North Dakota,8 9 Ohio,90 and South Carolina91 explicitly
82. Alabama: ALA. CODE § 13A-8-102 (Supp. 2004); Arizona: ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-2316(A) (2001); Arkansas: ARK. CODE ANN § 5-41-104 (1997); id. §§ 5-41-
202(a)(1), 5-41-203(b)(1) (Supp. 2005); Colorado: COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-5.5-102
(2005); Connecticut: CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-251 (2001); Delaware: DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 11, § 932 (2001); Florida: FLA. STAT ANN. § 815.06 (West 2006); Georgia:
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-9-153 (Supp. 2005); Hawaii: HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 708-890,
708-895.5(1) (Supp. 2005); Idaho: IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-2202 (2004); Illinois: 720
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/16D-3 (West 2003); Iowa: IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 714.1(8),
716.6B (West Supp. 2006); Kansas: KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3755(d) (Supp. 2005);
Maryland: MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 7-302 (LexisNexis 2005); Massachusetts:
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 266, § 120F (West 2000); Michigan: MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 752.795 (West 2004); Minnesota: MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.89 (West 2003 &
Supp. 2006); Missouri: Mo. ANN. STAT. § 569.099 (West 1999 & Supp. 2006); Ne-
braska: NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1347 (Reissue 1995); Nevada: NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 205.4765 (2003); New Hampshire: N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 638:17 (LexisNexis
1996 & Supp. 2005); New Jersey: N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:20-25 (West Supp. 2005);
New Mexico: N.M. STAT. § 30-45-5 (2004); New York: N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 156.05,
156.10 (2006); North Carolina: N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-454 (2003); North Dakota:
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06.1-08(2) (Supp. 2005); Ohio: OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 2913.04(B), 2913.421(D)(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2005); Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, § 1953(A)(4) (West 2002); Oregon: OR. REV. STAT. § 164.377(4)
(2003); Pennsylvania: 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 7611, 7613 (West Supp. 2005);
Rhode Island: R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-52-3 (2002); South Carolina: S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 16-16-10, 16-16-20(1) (Supp. 2004); Tennessee: TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-14-
602(b) (2003); Utah: UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-703 (2003 & Supp. 2005); Washing-
ton: WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.52.120 (West 2000); West Virginia: W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 61-3C-5 (West 2005) (computer services); id. § 61-3C-11 (obtaining confi-
dential public information); id. § 61-3C-12 (computer invasion of privacy); Wis-
consin: WIS. STAT. ANN. § 943.70(2) (West 2005); and Wyoming: Wyo. STAT. ANN.
§ 6-3-504 (2005). It does not appear that the District of Columbia, Alaska, Cali-
fornia, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Mississippi, Montana, Texas, Ver-
mont or Virginia have specific statutes prohibiting unauthorized access to
computers.
83. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2316(A) (2001).
84. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-9-92, 16-9-93(b)(3) (Supp. 2005).
85. HAW. REV. STATS. §§ 708-890, 708-895.5 to -895.7 (Supp. 2005).
86. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 7-302 (LexisNexis 2005).
87. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 752.795 (West 2004).
88. N.M. STAT. § 30-45-5 (2004).
89. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06.1-08(2) (Supp. 2005).
90. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2913.04(B), 2913.421(D)(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2005).
91. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-16-10, 16-16-20(1) (Supp. 2004) (subject to damages).
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prohibit access to a computer exceeding that authorized by the client
computer's owner. Oklahoma 92 and Kansas9 3 prohibit access exceed-
ing that authorized by the owner when coupled with resulting
damage.
Maryland's statute94 is typical of those prohibiting exceeding au-
thorized access, and its history illustrates the definitional problem. It
currently defines "access" to a computer as follows: "'Access' means to
instruct, communicate with, store data in, retrieve or intercept data
from, or otherwise use the resources of a computer program, computer
system, or computer network."9 5 The statute prohibits intentional un-
authorized access: "A person may not intentionally, willfully and with-
out authorization access .. .or exceed the person's authorized access
to all or part of a computer network . . . [or] computer ... "96
In any web transaction, there is no question that the server ac-
cesses the client computer-that is the point of the web transaction. 97
The more difficult question is whether the access is unauthorized.
Again, there seems little room to argue that the superficial transac-
tion between the client and server-the transfer from the server to the
client of the information actually requested by the user-is unautho-
rized. The superficial transaction is knowingly initiated by the user.98
If the user is given notice and understands that part of the transaction
will involve the collection and storage of information about the trans-
action on the user's computer, it would be difficult to argue that the
use of cookies constitutes unauthorized access. However, as noted
above, current browsers default to allow cookies and therefore do not
provide notice that they will be stored on the user's computer. Never-
theless, under standard contract principles, formal notice would be
92. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1953(3) (West 2002).
93. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3755(b)(3), (d) (2005).
94. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 7-302(a) (LexisNexis 2005) (originally enacted as
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 146(a) (1984)).
95. Id. § 7-302 (a)(2) (derived from former MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 146(a)(9), which
was substantially the same, providing: "'Access' means to instruct, communicate
with, store data in, retrieve data from, or otherwise make use of equipment in-
cluding, but not limited to, computers and other data processing equipment or
resources connected therewith.").
96. Id. § 7-302(c).
97. Although the transaction is initiated by the client with a request for information
(such as an HTML page) from the server, the server must also retrieve informa-
tion from the client in order to fulfill the request.
98. Certain transactions are arguably not "knowingly" initiated by the user (i.e., so-
called pop-up or pop-under ads). These are triggered by actions which the user
has taken, but are not specifically requested by the user. For an example, see
"What are Popups?" in Mozilla Firefox under "Help"/"Help Contents"/"Controlling
Popups." Current versions of browsers provide user control over pop-up and pop-
under ads, although they require the same type of navigation as the controls of
cookies. The special problems of pop-up and pop-under ads are beyond the scope
of this Article.
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unnecessary if the user were aware of the use of cookies and accepted
a benefit with such knowledge. 99 At this point, the available data
does not support such a position.
In 2000, Business Week conducted a survey on Internet privacy,1 00
asking, "If you use a computer, have you ever heard of an online tech-
nology known as 'cookies'?" Sixty percent of the respondents an-
swered "no." Of those respondents who had heard of cookies, seventy-
five percent correctly identified their function. In other words, only
thirty percent of respondents knew what a cookie does. When advised
that some websites track user movements online, thirty-five percent of
those who claimed to use the Internet responded that they would be
"not at all comfortable," and twenty-eight percent would be "not very
comfortable" with such websites even if the site did not tie their online
activity to their name or real-world identity. The numbers went to
sixty-eight and twenty-one percent, respectively, when the question
included linking browsing habits into a profile linked to the user's real
name and identity, and to eighty-two and thirteen percent, respec-
tively, when additional personal information such as income, driver's
license, credit data, and medical status was added to the profile. Even
without the link to identifying information or additional personal in-
formation, sixty-seven percent of respondents were "not at all comfort-
able" with sharing information that would allow tracking on multiple
websites, while twenty-four percent were "not very comfortable." The
message would appear to be that there is not sufficient awareness to
find implied consent to the use of cookies simply by virtue of use of the
web. A large majority of users would in fact object to the use of cookies
if made aware of them.
The argument still might be made that by initiating a transaction
with a website, the user has implicitly authorized whatever might fa-
cilitate that (or a similar future) transaction. That argument, how-
ever, would need to overcome the principle that consent given under a
mistaken understanding of the transaction is ineffective.10 1 Further-
more, the development of modern criminal statutes regarding unau-
99. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 69(1) (1981) ("Where an offeree fails
to reply to an offer, his silence and inaction operate as an acceptance in the fol-
lowing cases only: (a) Where an offeree takes the benefit of offered services with
reasonable opportunity to reject them and reason to know that they were offered
with the expectation of compensation. . . ."). A similar argument could be made to
support government use of cookies, since widespread knowledge of the use of
cookies would defeat an expectation of privacy with respect to information stored
in cookies.
100. Harris Interactive, Business Week/Harris Poll: A Growing Threat, Bus. WK.,
Mar. 20, 2000, http://www.businessweek.com/2000/00_12/b3673010.htm. The
data was collected by a telephone survey of 1,014 adults between March 2 and
March 6, 2000, by Harris Interactive. The raw data collected from the survey
(concerning cookies) is found infra in the appendix.
101. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892B (1979). The provision provides:
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thorized access suggests a trend toward prohibition not only of
unauthorized access, but also of access exceeding initial authority.
The evolution of the Maryland statute is instructive on this critical
question of authorized access, and particularly on the question of
whether a user's grant of access for one purpose is sufficient authori-
zation to cover all subsequent activities. As originally enacted, the
statute provided that
(2) A person may not intentionally, willfully, and without authorization ac-
cess, attempt to access, or cause access to a computer, computer network,...
[or] computer system, . . . to: . .. (ii) Alter, damage, or destroy data or a com-
puter program stored, maintained, or produced by . . . any part of these
systems .... 
1 0 2
In Briggs v. State,103 a criminal defendant, Terry Briggs, was a
computer programmer, hired as the system administrator of the Scar-
borough Group's network. His duties included management of the en-
tire system. Thus, his access to the computers clearly was authorized.
Following a dispute, however, Briggs resigned. Scarborough then dis-
covered that some of its files had been password protected, 104 and that
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (2), consent to conduct of another is
effective for all consequences of the conduct and for the invasion of any
interests resulting from it. (2) If the person consenting to the conduct of
another is induced to consent by a substantial mistake concerning the
nature of the invasion of his interests or the extent of the harm to be
expected from it and the mistake is known to the other or is induced by
the other's misrepresentation, the consent is not effective for the unex-
pected invasion or harm.
102. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 146(c) (1996 & Supp. 1997). The full text of the statute
provided as follows:
(c) Illegal access.-(1) A person may not intentionally, willfully, and
without authorization access, attempt to access, or cause access to a com-
puter, computer network, computer software, computer control lan-
guage, computer system, computer services, computer data base, or any
part of these systems or services.
(2) A person may not intentionally, willfully, and without authorization
access, attempt to access, or cause access to a computer, computer net-
work, computer software, computer control language, computer system,
computer services, computer data base, or any part of these systems or
services to:
(i) Cause the malfunction or interrupt the operation of a computer,
computer network, computer software, computer control language, com-
puter system, computer services, computer data base, or any part of
these systems or services; or
(ii) Alter, damage, or destroy data or a computer program stored,
maintained, or produced by a computer, computer network, computer
system, computer services, computer database, or any part of these sys-
tems or services.
(3) A person may not intentionally, willfully, and without authorization:
(i) Identify or attempt to identify any valid access codes; or
(ii) Distribute or publicize any valid access codes to any unauthorized
person.
103. 704 A.2d. 904 (Md. 1998).
104. Briggs admitted having placed the passwords. Id. at 906.
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only Briggs had the password, which Briggs had "difficulty remember-
ing."1o5 Briggs was charged with, among other things, unauthorized
access to a computer under article 27, section 146.106 The State's the-
ory was that "although Briggs was authorized to access the computer
system, he was not authorized to access the system in such a way as to
interrupt the operation of ... the system."' 0 7 The trial court denied a
motion for judgment of acquittal and a jury convicted on the charges of
unauthorized access.' 0 8 On appeal,' 0 9 Briggs argued that he had
been granted access to Scarborough's computer system and that the
statute did not cover "conduct that can be characterized as only ex-
ceeding authorized access." 1 10 The purpose of the statute, Briggs ar-
gued, "was to deter unauthorized users from breaking into computer
systems.""1 '
While it was disputed whether Briggs had been authorized to place
passwords on files, the court found it unnecessary to resolve that dis-
pute, holding it sufficient for reversal of the conviction that Briggs'
"access to the computer was not 'without authorization' within the
[plain] meaning of the statute."1 12 "Authorization" was not defined in
the statute, but, applying dictionary definitions, the court concluded
that the initial grant of access ended the inquiry: employees who had
permission "to 'instruct,' 'communicate with,' 'store data in,' or 're-
trieve data from'" a computer system were authorized within the
meaning of the statute and subject to no implied limits on their au-
thority.113 The court noted that
[tihe legislative history supports our reading of the statute. In 1984, in an
apparent response to the inadequacies of current criminal law to address dis-
ruptive or voyeuristic acts involving computer information systems, House
Bill 121, approved by both houses, and enacted as Chapter 588, 1984 Laws of
Maryland, criminalized "illegal access to computers." A representative of the
Department of Budget and Fiscal Planning testified in support of the bill:
Generally speaking, the threat [of computer crime] may be viewed as being
divided into two reasonably identifiable types: 1) those associated with crimi-
nal intent or activity, and 2) those associated with the so called "hacker" type
105. Id.
106. The full text of the statute under which Briggs was charged is set forth supra
note 102. Briggs was also charged with theft, but acquitted of those charges.
Briggs, 704 A.2d at 906 n.3.
107. Briggs, 704 A.2d at 906.
108. Id. The court sentenced Briggs to one year of incarceration, with all but two days
suspended, two years supervised probation, 150 hours of community service, and
a fine of $500. The court also ordered him to cooperate with Scarborough and
required him to release any remaining password information and client files. Id.
109. The verdict was appealed to the Maryland Court of Special Appeals, but the Ma-
ryland Court of Appeals granted certiorari on its own motion before consideration
by the Court of Special Appeals. Id.
110. Id. at 907.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 908.
113. Id. at 910.
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of activity, where just the challenge of penetrating the system, or some sort of
"electronic vandalism" or other mischief is the objective. While outright crimi-
nal activity involving information systems is covered by current statute, the
Department feels this bill provides a needed addition by directly addressing
the second type of threat by prohibiting all unauthorized access, for whatever
purpose, and by providing penalties for its occurrence. 1 1 4
Therefore, the court concluded,
The legislative history thus suggests that House Bill 121 was drafted in reac-
tion to the concern about the recent "hacker" activity. The Senate Judicial
Proceedings Committee Report for House Bill 121, reported favorably by
Chairman (now President of the Senate) Thomas V. Mike Miller, underscores
our conclusion that the statute should apply to those who break into com-
puters: . . . "This legislation is intended to make it a misdemeanor for a person
intentionally and without authorization to access, attempt to access or cause
access to a computer system. The purpose of the bill is to deter individuals
from breaking into computer systems."1 1 5
The court then invited the legislature to broaden the statute if it
intended the law to apply to cases such as Briggs.11 6 In 2002 the leg-
islature accepted the court's invitation, amending the statute 117 to
provide that "(1) A person may not intentionally, willfully, and with-
out authorization access, attempt to access, cause to be accessed, or
exceed the person's authorized access to all or part of a computer net-
work, computer control language, computer, computer software, com-
puter system, computer services, or computer database."ll8
The Maryland statute defines "computer" as "an electronic, mag-
netic, optical, organic, or other data processing device or system that
performs logical, arithmetic, memory, or storage functions."119 It de-
fines a "computer network" as "the interconnection of one or more
114. Id. (citation omitted).
115. Id. at 910-11 (citation omitted).
116. See id. at 911 ("If the law is to be broadened to include Briggs's conduct, it should
be modified by the Legislature, not by this Court.").
117. This amendment is now found at MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAw § 7-302 (LexisNexis
2005).
118. Id. § 7-302(c)(1) (emphasis added). The complete text of the current section 7-
302(c) provides as follows:
(1) A person may not intentionally, willfully, and without authorization
access, attempt to access, cause to be accessed, or exceed the person's
authorized access to all or part of a computer network, computer control
language, computer, computer software, computer system, computer ser-
vices, or computer database.
(2) A person may not commit an act prohibited by paragraph (1) of this
subsection with the intent to:
(i) cause the malfunction or interrupt the operation of all or any part of a
computer, computer network, computer control language, computer
software, computer system, computer services, or computer data; or
(ii) alter, damage, or destroy all or any part of data or a computer pro-
gram stored, maintained, or produced by a computer, computer network,
computer software, computer system, computer services, or computer
database.
119. Id. § 7-302 (a)(4)(i).
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computers through: (i) the use of a satellite, microwave, line, or other
communication medium; and (ii) terminals or a complex consisting of
two or more interconnected computers regardless of whether the inter-
connection is continuously maintained."1 20 It defines a "computer sys-
tem" as "one or more connected or unconnected computers, peripheral
devices, computer software, data, or computer programs."12 1
Thus, the definitions of computer, computer system, and computer
network are broad enough to encompass the client-server configura-
tion typically involved in web browsing, with the statute apparently
specifically directed to Internet-type connections.122
Given the history of the current statute, it would be difficult to ar-
gue that merely overstepping one's authority was not prohibited. Ma-
ryland's statutory revision was clearly a response to the Maryland
Court of Appeals' decision in Briggs, and clearly intended to clarify the
point that exceeding authority violates the statute.
Therefore, under such statutes, the fact that a transaction giving
rise to a cookie is initiated by the user will not protect the server's
owner from liability if the user does not authorize the cookie itself.
Setting the unauthorized cookie is a clear case of exceeding the scope
of initially authorized access.
The geographic reach of the Maryland statute is defined in subsec-
tion (f): "Venue.-A court of competent jurisdiction may try a person
prosecuted under this section in any county in this State where: (1)
the defendant performed the act; or (2) the accessed computer is
located."123
Thus, it is not necessary for the server to be located in Maryland;
access by a Maryland user would be sufficient to confer jurisdiction.
Since the nature of the Internet prevents a server from determining
(or verifying) the physical location of the client computer, the owner of
any server which sets cookies is at risk. The factor determining liabil-
ity is not the location of the server, but the location of the client.
C. Government Cookies: Searches and Takings?
Government websites set cookies. There are specific guidelines for
determining when it is appropriate for federal agencies to do so. 1 24
120. Id. § 7-302 (a)(7).
121. Id. § 7-302 (a)(11).
122. See id. § 7-302(a)(7).
123. Id. § 7-302(f).
124. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE U.S.
SENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, INTERNET PRIVACY: IMPLEMENTA-
TION OF FEDERAL GUIDANCE FOR AGENCY USE OF "COOKIES" (2001). While the re-
ported uses of cookies on government websites have, to date, involved federal
websites, the same issues would be posed by the use of cookies by state or local
governments or agencies.
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The information placed by government cookies can be used to track
what information is being requested by particular users. The Office of
Management and Budget, in its June 1, 1999 Guidance125 noted that
persistent cookies 126 raised "serious concerns" because they made it
"technically easy" for the agency to learn the complete history of users'
web activity.127 Following the same logic as developed in Part III, au-
thorization to engage in a web-based transaction is not equivalent to
authorization to set a cookie, or to read one that has previously been
set. Particularly since the government can aggregate all of the infor-
mation contained in cookies set by any government website, it has the
ability to produce a composite image of an individual.
Arguably, as in the corporate context, what takes place is an ex-
change of access in return for user information. The government,
however, is a special type of provider of information and in a special
situation with respect to obtaining information from its citizens.
The extent to which the government may require surrender of a
right other than through eminent domain has been analyzed by the
Supreme Court in a series of cases starting with the Ruckelshaus v.
Monsanto Co. trade secret case. 1 28 A trade secret is information that
derives independent economic value from not being generally known
or readily ascertainable by proper means, where its owner takes rea-
sonable steps under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy. 129
Trade secrets are violated by misappropriation: unauthorized access
to, use of, or disclosure of trade secrets obtained by improper
means.130 Trade secret law protects the information; the medium of
storage is irrelevant, and courts have specifically found data stored in
computers to qualify for trade secret protection. 13 1
If the information stored in cookies is viewed as a trade secret of
the computer owner, three consequences follow. First, unauthorized
access to, use of, or disclosure of such information is a misappropria-
tion of the trade secret. 13 2 Second, unauthorized use or disclosure of
such information by a government is a taking.133 And finally, unau-
thorized access to such information by a government may constitute
an unlawful search and seizure under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.
125. Office of Management and Budget, supra note 11.
126. These are cookies which were stored on a user's computer beyond the web brows-
ing session in which they were set. See discussion supra note 20 and accompany-
ing text.
127. Office of Management and Budget, supra note 11.
128. 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
129. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 537 (2005).
130. Id.
131. See Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986.
132. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1, 14 U.L.A. 537 (2005).
133. See discussion infra note 134 and accompanying text.
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It is clear that the superficial transaction-the request for infor-
mation and receipt of the response-is authorized. The deeper issue is
whether the government can require authorization of cookies in order
to obtain access to the requested information.
In Monsanto, the Supreme Court specifically addressed whether
the government's use of trade secret information constituted a taking
under the Fifth Amendment. 1 34 Monsanto had submitted proprietary
data to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in order to obtain
permission to market a compound regulated by the Federal Insecti-
cide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).135 Under EPA regula-
tions, the agency was permitted to use Monsanto's proprietary data in
evaluating submissions for similar compounds submitted by Mon-
santo's competitors. While the EPA might have compelled Monsanto
to make the data available to competitors through eminent domain,
the Fifth Amendment would require payment of "just compensa-
tion,"136 and instead the agency chose to rely on the argument that
the data had been voluntarily submitted and could be used for any
authorized regulatory purpose. The Court held that trade secrets
were property 137 subject to the protection of the Fifth Amendment,
and that their use by the government triggered the right to just com-
pensation. Although the Court found an adequate remedy that al-
lowed avoiding enjoining the use,13 8 it did deal with the question
whether Monsanto's voluntary submission of the data in order to ob-
tain the required EPA license constituted a waiver of the constitu-
tional protection.139 While noting that there was "no set formula" and
that courts must look to the particular circumstances of each case, 140
the Court held that since Monsanto was "aware of the conditions
under which the data are submitted, and the conditions are rationally
related to a legitimate Government interest, a voluntary submission of
data by an applicant in exchange for the economic advantages of a
registration can hardly be called a taking."141 The valuable benefit
134. See Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1004.
135. 7 U.S.C. § 136 (2000).
136. "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensa-
tion." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
137. The information qualified as a trade secret under the relevant state law (Mis-
souri). Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1003. Thus, not only does Monsanto bear on the
"access in exchange for information" question, but also on the question whether
information as to a user's browsing route is a protectable property right.
138. See Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2000); Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1016.
139. There was also an issue as to information submitted under old regulations which
did not explicitly state that the EPA would use the data in evaluating competi-
tors' applications. As to these, the Court held that there was a taking. See Mon-
santo, 467 U.S. at 1009.
140. Id. at 1005 (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979)).
141. Id. at 1007.
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which Monsanto received in return for the use of its proprietary data
included a term of exclusive license to use its compound and the right
to compensation from competitors who wished to rely on Monsanto's
data.14 2
At the other end of the spectrum, in Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission,14 3 a state refused to grant a permit to improve existing
beachfront property unless the owner dedicated a public easement. 14 4
While the dissent would have considered the grant of a permit a bene-
fit akin to that in Monsanto,14 5 the majority disagreed, stating that
"the announcement that the application for (or granting of) the permit
w[ould] entail the yielding of a property interest cannot be regarded as
establishing the voluntary 'exchange' that we found to have occurred
in Monsanto."146 The Nollan Court explained that the ability to im-
prove one's own property, though subject to some regulation, is not
comparable to the type of government benefit proffered in exchange
for use and disclosure of trade secret information in Monsanto.14 7
Thus, Nollan recognizes that the mere granting of permission to en-
gage in routine activities, incident to existing rights, does not consti-
tute compensation sufficient to support a Monsanto-type exchange.
Likewise, in Philip Morris Inc. v. Reilly, 14s Massachusetts had re-
quired tobacco companies to submit proprietary information in order
to continue doing business in the Commonwealth. The court found no
exchange which compensated Philip Morris: allowing a company to
continue to do business did not provide the required benefit under
Monsanto.149
It is therefore unlikely that a government could avoid the taking
requirements simply by arguing that a user of its website had volunta-
rily surrendered its rights (even if the government provides notice
that cookies are being used). As in Philip Morris, the user is only ac-
cessing data it already has the right to access. Unlike Monsanto, no
special benefit is conferred on a specific user in exchange for access to
the information.
D. Accessory/Secondary Liability
Cases analyzing secondary liability for third-party actions in civil
contexts provide insight into whether providers of software which fa-
142. See id.; Philip Morris Inc. v. Reilly, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d 1065, 1081-82 (1st Cir. 2002)
(discussing Monsanto).
143. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
144. See id. at 828.
145. See id. at 860 n.10 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 833 n.2 (majority opinion) (quoting Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1007).
147. Id.
148. 65 U.S.P.Q.2d 1065, 1082 (1st Cir. 2002).
149. See id.
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cilitates setting cookies without authorization should face secondary
liability. Two Supreme Court cases have focused on liability150 of
providers of enabling technology: Sony Corp. of America v. Universal
City Studios, Inc. 151 and MGM v. Grokster.152
Under Sony, it would be difficult to impose secondary liability on
the producers of web browsers predicated on the use of those browsers
to violate the rights of others. The Sony decision exonerated Sony
from liability for the manufacture of videorecorders, even though the
videorecorders could be used (and were shown to have been widely
used) to violate the rights of copyright holders, 15 3 because the vide-
orecorders were also capable of substantial uses which did not violate
the rights of copyright holders.154
Analyzing the theory of liability for actions of others (in Sony, lia-
bility for contributory copyright infringement committed by third-
party users of Sony's videorecorders), the Supreme Court held that the
sale of videotape recorders,
like the sale of other articles of commerce, does not constitute contributory
infringement if the product is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable pur-
poses. Indeed, it need merely be capable of substantial noninfringing uses.
The question is thus whether the Betamax is capable of commercially signifi-
cant noninfringing uses. In order to resolve that question, we need not ex-
plore all the different potential uses of the machine and determine whether or
not they would constitute infringement. Rather, we need only consider
whether on the basis of the facts as found by the District Court a significant
number of them would be noninfringing.1 5 5
At the time that the Sony case reached the Supreme Court, no stat-
ute imposed secondary liability for facilitating violation of a copyright
owner's rights.156 However, the Sony court noted
the absence of such express language in the copyright statute does not pre-
clude the imposition of liability ... on certain parties who have not themselves
150. Both cases were civil cases based on secondary liability for alleged violations of
copyright. The copyright statute also has provisions imposing criminal liability.
See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 506 (2000).
151. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
152. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005).
153. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 455 n.40.
154. Id.
155. Sony, 464 U.S. at 442. Betamax was Sony's brand of videotape recorder at the
time; it used a proprietary recording format (Beta), which Sony no longer
produces.
156. "The Copyright Act does not expressly render anyone liable for infringement com-
mitted by another. In contrast, the Patent Act expressly brands anyone who 'ac-
tively induces infringement of a patent' as an infringer, 35 U.S.C. § 271(b), and
further imposes liability on... 'contributory' infringers, § 271(c)." Sony, 464 U.S.
at 434-35. The Copyright Statute now does impose secondary liability in one
particular circumstance: 17 U.S.C. § 905(3) prohibits inducing or knowingly caus-
ing infringement of semiconductor designs and raises questions as to whether the
judicially created concept of secondary liability in the copyright act was implicitly
narrowed by passage of this specific statutory statement of secondary liability.
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engaged in the infringing activity. For vicarious liability is imposed in virtu-
ally all areas of the law, and the concept of contributory infringement is
merely a species of the broader problem of identifying the circumstances in
which it is just to hold one individual accountable for the actions of
another.1
5 7
Traditionally, secondary liability for copyright infringement has
been divided into two categories: contributory infringement and vica-
rious infringement.158 Contributory infringement liability is imposed
upon "one who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces,
causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of an-
other."'159 Vicarious liability for copyright infringement is imposed
upon a party who, while not directly committing infringement, facili-
tates infringement by another whom the vicariously liable party has
"the right and ability to supervise [which] coalesce[s] with an obvious
and direct financial interest in the exploitation of copyrighted
materials."160
Since Sony-type vicarious liability requires either control over the
primary infringer or financial benefit from the infringement, a defen-
157. Sony, 464 U.S. at 435 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
158. It is arguable that the Sony decision does not observe the traditional definitions
in its use of the terms "contributory liability" and "vicarious liability." "[T]he
[Sony] Court [treated] vicarious and contributory infringement interchangeably."
In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 654 (7th Cir. 2003) (interpreting
Sony, 464 U.S. at 435 & n.17).
159. Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d
Cir. 1971) (footnote omitted). Columbia Artists Management (CAMI) promoted a
local community concert association that in turn sponsored a concert in which
copyrighted musical compositions were performed without permission. The dis-
trict court granted summary judgment against CAMI, stating that by "organiz-
ing, supervising, and controlling" the local association, and by "knowingly
participat[ing]" in the association's infringing activity, CAMI caused the infringe-
ment. Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 312 F. Supp. 581,
583 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). The Second Circuit affirmed:
With knowledge that its artists included copyrighted compositions in
their performances, CAMI created the.. . audience as a market for those
artists. CAMI's pervasive participation in the formation and direction of
this association and its programming of compositions presented amply
support the district court's finding that it "caused th[e] copyright
infringement."
Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1162-63 (quoting Gershwin, 312 F. Supp. at 583).
160. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1963)
(holding a department store vicariously liable for copyright infringement by its
record sales concessionaire). See also Dreamland Ball Room, Inc. v. Shapiro,
Bernstein & Co., 36 F.2d 354 (7th Cir. 1929) (holding dance hall vicariously liable
for copyright infringement committed by the orchestra it had hired); KECA Mu-
sic, Inc. v. Dingus McGee's Co., 432 F. Supp. 72 (W.D. Mo. 1977) (holding cocktail
lounge vicariously liable for infringement by musicians who played background
music); cf. Artists Music Inc. v. Reed Publ'g Inc., 31 U.S.P.Q.2d 1623 (S.D.N.Y.
1994) (holding that landlord who received the same rent regardless of the profits
earned by its tenant and who could not control the infringing activity on the
premises was not vicariously liable for infringement by its tenant).
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dant may escape liability by showing the lack of either. In addition,
under Sony, a defense (imported from patent law) is available to sec-
ondary copyright defendants.16 1 The exact nature of the defense is
susceptible to at least four readings of the standard:
[T]he sale of copying equipment, like the sale of other articles of commerce,
does not constitute contributory infringement if the product is widely used for
legitimate, unobjectionable purposes. Indeed, it need merely be capable of sub-
stantial noninfringing uses. The question is thus whether the Betamax is ca-
pable of commercially significant noninfringing uses. In order to resolve that
question, we need not explore all the different potential uses of the machine
and determine whether or not they would constitute infringement. Rather,
we need only consider whether on the basis of the facts as found by the Dis-
trict Court a significant number of them would be noninfringing.1 6 2
As technology advanced, subsequent cases considered the argu-
ment that providing software that facilitates widespread violations of
rights could impose secondary liability on the provider of the software,
with a split in the circuits over the correct reading of the Sony stan-
dard. For example, the Seventh Circuit found secondary infringement
for facilitating peer-to-peer file sharing, 163 while the Ninth Circuit
found such activities insufficient to impose secondary liability.164
Manufacturers of web browsers could not face secondary liability
under any reading of the Sony standard, because web browser
software clearly has significant uses which do not infringe user's
rights. However, in 2005, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Grokster165 to resolve the conflict between the Seventh and Ninth Cir-
cuits' interpretations of Sony. MGM complained that software distrib-
uted by Grokster facilitated peer-to-peer transfer of files over the
161. Sony, 464 U.S. at 442. The Court stated,
The staple article of commerce doctrine must strike a balance between a
copyright holder's legitimate demand for effective-not merely sym-
bolic-protection of the statutory monopoly, and the rights of others
freely to engage in substantially unrelated areas of commerce. Accord-
ingly, the sale of copying equipment, like the sale of other articles of
commerce, does not constitute contributory infringement if the product
is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes. Indeed, it need
merely be capable of substantial noninfringing uses.
Id.
162. Id. (emphasis added to identify the possible ways to read the standard). For a
suggested interpretation that harmonizes the four possible readings, see Max
Stul Oppenheimer, Yours for Keeps: MGM v. Grokster, J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER
& INFO. L. 209 n.96 (2005).
163. In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S.
1107 (2004). Aimster was not a primary infringer; "because copies of the songs
reside on the computers of the users and not on Aimster's own server, Aimster is
not a direct infringer of the copyrights on those songs. Its function is similar to
that of a stock exchange, which is a facility for matching offers rather than a
repository of the things being exchanged . . . ." Id. at 646-47.
164. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir.
2004), vacated, 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005).
165. 543 U.S. 1032 (2004).
20061
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Internet in violation of its copyrights. 166 MGM did not allege that
Grokster had committed direct copyright infringement, but instead ar-
gued that Grokster was secondarily liable for enabling massive copy-
right infringement.16 7
The Court was unable to reach a majority decision on the Sony is-
sue168 and instead turned to a different basis for secondary liability:
inducement. 169 The Grokster Court held that the basis of Grokster's
liability was not limited to interpretations of Sony; the Sony decision
"did not displace other theories of secondary liability,"17 0 and secon-
dary liability based on inducement could be established by showing
"intent to bring about infringement and distribution of a device suita-
ble for infringing use" plus "evidence of actual infringement by recipi-
ents of the device." 17 1 The Court found it significant that the
defendants had not attempted to design their product so as to mini-
mize the risk that it would be used to infringe others' rights.17 2
Browsers are set to accept cookies by default. This facilitates the
widespread violation of users' rights. Unlike Sony, under Grokster,
there can be secondary liability if a product facilitates a violation and
the producer has not attempted to design it so as to minimize the risk
of that violation. This may well be enough to run afoul of the Grokster
standard. It would be a simple matter to set the defaults on browser
software to reject cookies. Why, then, have the producers of browser
software chosen to set the defaults to accept cookies? It would be diffi-
cult to construct an argument that would provide an alternative to the
166. The plaintiffs alleged that they "own the copyrights in most of the material in-
fringed on Grokster and StreamCast, and they are the only copyright owners
with sufficient resources and incentives to litigate effectively against respon-
dents." Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 29, Grokster, 125 S. Ct. 2764 (No. 04-
480).
167. MGM, in its petition for writ of certiori, alleged that "[m] ore than 2.6 billion in-
fringing music files are downloaded each month," and that "between 400,000 and
600,000 copies of motion pictures are unlawfully downloaded each day." Id. at 8.
168. Compare concurring opinion of Justices Ginsburg, Rehnquist, and Kennedy,
Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2783 (Ginsburg, J., concurring; with Rehnquist, C.J., Ken-
nedy, J.), with id. at 2787 (Breyer, J., concurring; with Stevens and O'Connor,
J.J.).
169. The "inducement" standard adopted by the Court was not argued by any of the
parties, but was suggested in an amicus brief filed by Senators Leahy and Hatch.
BriefAmici Curiae of United States Senator Patrick Leahy & United States Sen-
ator Orrin G. Hatch in Support of Neither Party at 13, Grokster, 125 S. Ct. 2764
(No. 04-480) (stating that Sony "explicitly and deliberately left aside liability
based on inducement" (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 439 n.19)).
170. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2778 (plurality opinion).
171. Id. at 2782.
172. Id. at 2781 ("[The] evidence of unlawful objective is given added significance by
MGM's showing that neither [defendant] attempted to develop filtering tools or
other mechanisms to diminish the infringing activity using their software ....
[W]e think this evidence underscores Grokster's and StreamCast's intentional fa-
cilitation of their users' infringement.")
INTERNET COOKIES
obvious conclusion that business considerations drove the decision
and that the manufacturers intended to bring about the result that
servers could set cookies without clients' knowing authorization.
V. WHOSE LAW? WHOSE COURTS?
It is convenient to think of Internet transactions as taking place in
"cyberspace." To date, however, cyberspace does not have a court sys-
tem, so it is necessary to decide which of the existing courts can assert
personal jurisdiction over parties who engage in transactions not tied
to a specific physical location. Conceptually, there are arguable dis-
tinctions between transactions which a defendant has chosen to initi-
ate 173 and those which the defendant has chosen to accommodate, but
which the plaintiff initiated. 174
While the analysis of these two types of transactions might differ,
the constitutional framework is the same. Jurisdiction must be based
on statutory authority and constitutional due process. 17 5 The statu-
tory authority is typically provided by a long-arm statute, conferring
jurisdiction over parties transacting business or causing injury in the
forum state.
The fundamental constitutional test for jurisdiction is whether the
defendant has "minimum contacts" with the forum jurisdiction "such
that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice."'176 Factors which have entered into
the determination include:
1. Whether the defendant "purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privi-
lege of conducting activities within the forum state."17 7 Jurisdic-
tion lies when a defendant has "'purposefully directed' his
activities at residents of the forum."' 7 8 In particular, jurisdiction
is proper in the state where the injury occurs if the defendant
placed the injurious products in "the stream of commerce with the
173. An example would be an e-mail sent by the defendant to the plaintiff. A further
distinction could be drawn between transactions which the defendant chose to
initiate with the specific plaintiff, and those which the defendant initiated with
multiple parties (of whom the defendant was one) but without a specific intent to
contact the specific defendant (e.g., spam).
174. An example would be a website, owned by the defendant, which set cookies with-
out explicit permission of the plaintiff. Technically, the transaction would be ini-
tiated by the plaintiffs decision to visit the defendant's website. Conceptually,
the plaintiffs website might be viewed as an attractive nuisance.
175. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
176. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v.
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
177. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
178. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) (quoting Keeton v.
Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984)).
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expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the fo-
rum State;"1
7 9
2. Whether the claim arose out of the defendant's activity in the fo-
rum state;SO
3. Whether the defendant "should reasonably anticipate being haled
into court" in the forum state;' 8 ' and
4. The state's interest and "fairness" to the parties.' 8 2
State courts have disagreed on whether sending an e-mail is sufficient
to establish jurisdiction in the recipient's state. An Arkansas court
has held it sufficient, ' 8 3 while a Utah court has held it insufficient.18 4
Maintaining an Internet site does not require the same specific de-
cision to contact the forum state as does sending an e-mail. Although
it might well fall within the reasoning of World- Wide Volkswagen that
its contents are being placed in commerce with the knowledge that
they might enter the forum state and cause injury, cases have held
that merely maintaining a website which is accessed by a user in an-
other jurisdiction is insufficient contact with the user's state to estab-
lish jurisdiction. 8 5 It is easy to see the practical reason why the two
categories should lead to different results-otherwise, every website
owner would be subject to jurisdiction in every state.
179. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297-98 (1980).
180. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445 (1952) (exercise of per-
sonal jurisdiction over the defendant requires contacts with the forum state that
are "continuous and systematic"); see also McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co. 355 U.S.
220 (1957) (the least contact with the forum state that the Supreme Court has
allowed is one contact).
181. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
182. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
183. Kirwan v. State, 96 S.W.3d 724 (Ark. 2003) (relying on ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-27-
304(a) (1997), which made it illegal to ship child pornography into the state).
184. Fenn v. MLeads Enter., Inc., 137 P.3d 706 (Utah 2006). The Fenn court found
specific personal jurisdiction improper as violative of the due process clause
where plaintiff, a Utah resident, received one unsolicited advertising e-mail with-
out "ADV:" in the subject line as required by the Utah Unsolicited Commercial
and Sexually Explicit Email Act, where defendant did not know specifically that
its agent would send an e-mail to plaintiff or to any Utah resident and where
plaintiff did not allege any economic, physical, emotional, or dignitary damages.
The intermediate appellate court had noted, "[Tihis issue is a matter of first im-
pression in Utah and, as far as our research has revealed, in all of the United
States." Fenn v. MLeads Enter., Inc., 103 P.3d 156, 159 (Utah Ct. App. 2004).
There had already been other cases involving jurisdiction in the case of e-mail,
but they involved massive e-mailings and the question of whether jurisdiction
was proper where the ISP maintained the computer which handled the e-mails.
Verizon Online Servs., Inc. v. Ralsky, 203 F. Supp. 2d 601 (E.D. Va. 2002); In-
ternet Doorway, Inc. v. Parks, 138 F. Supp. 2d 773 (S.D. Miss. 2001); Washing-
ton v. Heckel, 93 P.3d 189 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004). Of course, the fact that the e-
mails were sent by an agent would be no defense under traditional principles of
respondeat superior.
185. Soma Med. Int'l v. Standard Chartered Bank, 196 F.3d 1292 (10th Cir. 1999).
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Plaintiffs seeking to bring federal class actions have typically ad-
vanced multiple theories, including federal statutory, state statutory,
and common law claims, but federal courts have been reluctant to re-
tain jurisdiction when the federal claims have been dismissed.
Chance v. Avenue A, Inc.18 6 presents a typical complaint. There, the
plaintiffs alleged that they had used the Internet, visited websites,
and had an Avenue A "cookie" placed on their computers, thus permit-
ting Avenue A to monitor their electronic communications without
their knowledge, authorization, or consent. They moved for class cer-
tification to include tens of millions of Internet users, alleging viola-
tions of the federal Wiretap Act,187 the Stored Communications
Act,l88 the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act,189 common law (invasion
of privacy, trespass, and unjust enrichment), and Washington statutes
prohibiting wiretapping and deceptive and unfair business practices.
The court dismissed the federal statutory claims on definitional
grounds' 90 and, as a matter of discretion, declined to maintain supple-
mental jurisdiction over the remaining state causes of action, which it
characterized as "novel and complex."19 1
VI. SOLUTIONS
The problems described above arise when there is a confluence of
four conditions: (1) browsers are set to accept cookies by default; (2)
server owners choose to set cookies; (3) some users are unaware of the
fact that cookies are being set; and (4) a statute (which defines unlaw-
ful access sufficiently broadly to encompass setting cookies) prohibits
unauthorized access to a computer. Removing any one of these condi-
tions would insulate against criminal liability.
If browsers were set to deny cookies by default, then cookies could
only be set if the user took a conscious step to enable them. This
would constitute authorization under any of the statutes currently in
force. If the cookie has been knowingly authorized, the issue of ex-
ceeding access authority disappears.192
186. 165 F. Supp. 2d 1153 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
187. Wire and Electronic Communications Interception and Interception of Oral Com-
munications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
188. Id. § 2701(a).
189. Id. § 1030.
190. The plaintiffs failed to meet the CFAA requirement of $5,000 damages from a
single act or event. Chance, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 1158-59. The court found suffi-
cient authorization to avoid liability under the ECPA, and that the Wiretap Act
did not apply because one party to the transaction had consented.
191. Id. at 1163.
192. The default would need to be set on a user-by-user basis or the authorization
argument would fail. The problem of a user who is computer literate but legally
incompetent-a relatively common situation-would remain. However, most
statutes explicitly require knowingly unauthorized access as an element of the
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Owners of websites can avoid liability by acquiring authorization
broad enough to cover setting cookies. 19 3 There are a number of ways
to accomplish this, such as providing conspicuous notice that the web-
site is using cookies and a description of the information being stored.
If users were to proceed with such knowledge,194 the access to their
computers would be authorized. Elementary contract law provides
that authorization can be manifested by action and that formalities
are not required. 19 5 This could be accomplished through a formal con-
tract, entered into as part of the relationship (for example, where the
user is a subscriber to a service). Authorization could also be ob-
tained, however, by less formal means.19 6
A conspicuous notice on the home webpage stating that cookies are
used and identifying what information is stored for how long should be
sufficient, especially if coupled with the requirement of some action by
the user indicating an understanding of the site's cookie policy. Again,
this establishes authority (and follows the European Union's directive
approach). In the future, if knowledge of the use of cookies were to
become so widespread as to presume authorization, notice on a specific
website might no longer be necessary.
Finally, the statutes could be changed. Given the range of state
statutory standards and the reach of state statutes (governing trans-
actions which involve a computer within their borders, regardless of
the location of the website server), website owners and hosts would
offense, and those which are not explicit would likely be interpreted to require
intent. See supra section IV.B.
193. There is, of course, another way to avoid liability: avoid the use of cookies.
194. This assumes the users are competent. The special problems of dealing with par-
ties who are not competent is beyond the scope of this Article.
195. Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 403 (2d Cir. 2004) ("We recognize
that contract offers on the Internet often require the offeree to click on an 'I agree'
icon. And no doubt, in many circumstances, such a statement of agreement by
the offeree is essential to the formation of a contract. But not in all circum-
stances. While new commerce on the Internet has exposed courts to many new
situations, it has not fundamentally changed the principles of contract. It is stan-
dard contract doctrine that when a benefit is offered subject to stated conditions,
and the offeree makes a decision to take the benefit with knowledge of the terms
of the offer, the taking constitutes an acceptance of the terms, which accordingly
become binding on the offeree." (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §
69 (1)(a) (1981)). But see Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com., Inc., CV99-7654-
HLH(VBKx), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6483 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2003) (apparently
turning on the lack of an "I agree" button to signify assent).
196. Such means would, of course, need to meet the ordinary contract law require-
ments of offer and knowing acceptance. For example, in Specht v. Netscape Com-
munications Corp., 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002), the court declined to enforce
arbitration terms relating to Netscape's software because it was not clear that
users downloading the software had necessarily seen the terms. The terms were
posted on the website from which the user downloaded Netscape's software, but
would not be seen unless the user scrolled down beyond the point where they
could download the software.
INTERNET COOKIES
benefit from a unified set of rules. While the owners of websites may
initially be tempted to opt for the quick fix of a federal statute "immu-
nizing" the use of cookies from liability, passage of such a statute
would require overcoming clear public opposition.197 Such a crude ap-
proach, however, is not needed. What is needed is a unified approach
to jurisdiction, to eliminate the uncertainty of multiple state laws ap-
plying to the same transaction, plus such simple steps as notification
in order to comply with the mainstream definition of consent. In-
ternet transactions are clearly interstate commerce and Congress has
repeatedly used its Commerce Clause power to regulate the In-
ternet. 198 It could use that power to establish a unified national stan-
dard for obtaining permission to set cookies. This is not an area where
the federalist principle of allowing state experimentation is appropri-
ate, nor is it an area in which varying community standards might
justify different rules in different communities. It is an area in which
broad education and unified standards would benefit both users and
website owners.
197. In the 2000 Business Week poll, see Harris Interactive, supra note 100, fifty-seven
percent of the respondents felt that "the government should pass laws now for
how personal information can be collected and used on the Internet." It is clear
from the balance of the poll results, see supra note 100 and accompanying text;
see also infra appendix, that the laws they have in mind are not ones that would
foster growth of cookie use without consent.
198. While Congress struggles to find a constitutional way of regulating speech on the
Internet, its early attempts-the Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-104 § 502, 110 Stat. 133 (1994) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 223
(2002)), and the Child Online Protection Act (COPA), 47 U.S.C. § 231 (2000)-
failed not for lack of congressional authority over the Internet, but for impact on
free speech. The problem is one of drafting, not power.
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APPENDIX
The following raw data was collected by a telephone survey of
1,014 adults between March 2 and March 6, 2000, by Harris
Interactive:19 9
If you use a computer, have you ever heard of an online technology known as
'cookies"?
Yes 40
No 60
If you have heard of cookies, which of the following best describes your under-
standing of what they are?
Files downloaded onto your computer that track your online habits 75
A hacker who breaks the security of private computer systems 5
The telephone number used to dial into an online service 4
The place where e-mail is stored indefinitely 3
Don't know 12
If you have heard of cookies, how often do you set your computer to reject
them?
Always 21
Sometimes 21
Rarely 10
Never 43
Don't know 5
Some Web sites track personal information to match users with products and
services that meet their needs. Other Web sites profit by sharing or selling user
information to other organizations. If you use the Internet, how comfortable would
you be if a Web site did the following?
Very Somewhat Not Very Not At All Not
Comfortable Comfortable Comfortable Comfortable Sure
Tracked your movements when you browsed the site, but didn't tie that
information to your name or real-world identity
9 28 28 35 *
Merged your browsing habits and shopping patterns into a profile that was
linked to your real name and identity
3 7 21 68 1
Created a profile of you that included your real name and identity as well as
additional personal information such as your income, driver's license, credit
data, and medical status
3 2 13 82 0
How comfortable would you be if a Web site did the following?
Very Somewhat Not Very Not At All Not
Comfortable Comfortable Comfortable Comfortable Sure
Tracked your movements when you browsed the site, but didn't tie that
information to your name or real-world identity
9 28 28 35 *
Shared your information with other organizations
1 6 25 67 *
Sold your information to other organizations
1 5 19 74 *
Shared information so you could be tracked on multiple Web sites
1 7 24 67 0-
199. Harris Interactive, supra note 100.
